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THE SUPREME COURT, THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS

*

By
WILLIAM

1.

F.

SWINDLER

t

THE COURT AS PART OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS

the selection of Richard M. Nixon as President of the United
States in 1968, the role of the Supreme Court in the American
political process has become a subject of discussion more fervid than
at any time since the crisis of the New Deal 30 years ago. There
has indeed traditionally been an elaborate and self-conscious protestation that the judicial branch of the government in the United
States was by definition distinguishable from the legislative and
executive branches by the fact that it was entirely non-political. As
early as 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall declared: "The province
of the Court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion." I The fact that Marshall in this
famous case then proceeded to inquire into that very matter, did not
deter his successors from compounding the fiction. "It is the
province of a court to expound the law, not to make it," said Chief
Justice Roger B. Taney in 1849.2 As late as 1936 Justice Owen J.
Roberts added:
WITH

It is sometimes said that the Court assumes a power to overrule or
control the action of the people's representatives. This is a misconception.
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and established
by the people. All legislation must conform to the principles it lays down.
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the
government has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution which
is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether
the latter squares with the former. . . . This court neither approves nor
condemns any legislative policy.3

Not only has all this been a manifest case of protesting too much,
but there have been at least an equal number of jurists who have
taken the opposite view. In the twentieth century, these expressions
• A lecture delivered on July 13, 1970, at the Law Society's Hall, Chancery Lane,
London, at the invitation of the British Institute of International and Comparative
Law.
Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.
I Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 170 (1803).
2. Luther v. Borden, 7 Howard 1 (1849).

- United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
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may be dated from Justice Oliver ,Wendell Holmes' well-remembered
comment that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution "does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," in cases of that
date challenging the government's efforts to assert an authority to
cope with some of the depredations of laissez-faire capitalism."
Twenty years later Professor Felix Frankfurter was to observe that
"when members of the Court decide [major cases] they move in the
field of statesmanship." 5 Twenty years after that, AttorneyGeneral Robert H. Jackson was to write:
[By] 1933, by the efficacy of its words, the Court had not only established its ascendancy over the entire government as a source of constitutional doctrine, but, it had also taken control of a large and rapidly
expanding sphere of policy....
This political role of the Court has been obscure to laymen-even
to most lawyers.

Its members . . . have generally abstained from party

politics. It speaks only through the technical forms of the lawsuit,
which
6
are not identified with politics in is popularly accepted sense.

American Presidents and presidential candidates have usually
tended to follow the genteel tradition and-at least in their public
statements-to preserve the fiction that the highest court in the land
functioned in a political vacuum. Even the two Roosevelts, whose
legislative reforms were buffeted and frequently wrecked between the
Scylla and Charybdis of a narrow and literalistic interpretation of
the American Constitution in the eras of the Square Deal and the
New Deal-even these Presidents avoided a confrontation with the
court on these terms for as long as possible. -Both were conspicuously silent on the subject in the electoral campaigns of 1904
and 1936. The second Roosevelt, when he eventually felt obliged to
join the issue in the great judicial battle of 1937, lost both the battle
and, his effective control of Congress as a result-even though 'he
may have'won the war.'
American Congresses, on the other hand, have frequently challenged the court on the political field. Ti e Judiciary Act of 1801,
which postponed -for a year the day of reckoning in Marbury v.
Madison, was only the first of a number of instances. One need
only recall the tampering with the composition of the court in the
Reconstruction Era following the American Civil War, th& New Deal
crisis of the 1930 and the near-revolt of political conservatives over
the so-called "Fifth Amendment" cases of the late 1950s. It was,
in fact, the pivotal period in the modem history of the United States,
4
6

7

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905).
New Republic, Vol. 27, p. 231 (July 27, 1921).
Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (New York, 1941), Intro., pp. x, xi.
Cf. Baker, Back to Back: The Duel Between FDR and the Supreme Court (New

York, 1967), passim.
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in the -years, from 1933 to 1937, which may be seen now, some '35
years later, to have dispelled the illusion (to the degree that it, was
ever generally believed). that the judicial branch of the American
Government functioned in a political vacuum. ' Indeed, the frequency
with which ideological combinations have changed in this period of
slightly more than three decades-with President and Congress first
united against an excessively conservative court, 'then the court and
the President aligned against a frequently conservative Congress in
the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Presidencies, and again a
conservative President and Congress confronting a 'liberal court in
the Eisenhower years-is the best perspective in which to view the
developing issues of the Nixon administration.
To recapitulate briefly the critical issue which had developed by
the mid-thirties: The first New Deal Congress, called into special
session in 1933 to pass'emergency legislation striving to cope with
an unprecedented economic crisis, 'had responded with statutory
enactments unprecedented in themselves--defining'sweeping governmenial authority to regulate private economic.' activities which,
according to prevailing constitutional Iadjudication, had theretofore
been beyond the Teach of public regulatory processes. Hastily
drafted as the legislation was, and (in the 'opinion of some contemporaries) ineptly argued by government counsel in test cases which
challenged the constitutionality of the legislation, it was all but
predictable that the first New Deal statutes of this nature would
run into disaster. In essence the statutes, defining. a paramount legislative authority to cope with domestic economic questions, ran
directly counter to prevailing Supreme Court doctrine that legislative
authority' was rigidly circumscribed by the .literal wordage of the
Constitution, and 'that private enterprise in general' was insulated
from surveillance and regulation by public authority.
This function of judicial review-the paramount prerogative of
the Supreme Court to determine the validity of legislative or executive action on the basis of the court's interpretation of the letter and
spirit of the written Constitution-is now taken for granted by
virtually all schools of American political thought, whether conservative or liberal. Whether or not this is a rational proposition in
the view of persons ling under other constitutional systems, the
central fact for the present exposition is that two political consequences derive from this function: The first is a judicial interpretation of constitutional wordage (that is' more often general. than
specific) that will inevitably vary with the constitutional philosophy
of the individual members of the court. This is reflected in the
continuing debate over "strict construction " v. "broad construc-
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tion" of the wordage. The second is a corollary of the -first: if the
prevailing construction of the constitutional wordage is politically
unpopular, action of the "political" branches, the executive and
the legislative, may aim at inducing the "non-political" judiciary
to introduce a different construction.
These were the ultimate political issues with which Franklin
Roosevelt grappled in 1937, and with which President Nixon has
also sought to grapple in 1969 and 1970. In both periods, the
Chief Executive has 'shown up rather poorly, as a heavy-handed
and clumsy political vandal seeking to. violate the sanctuary of a
constitutional palladium. For it is necessary to understand that,
however unpopular the Supreme Court's political decisions may be
at any given time, there is a vast emotional residuum of American
public opinion which opposes even the appearance of presidential
(and, to a lesser degree, Congressional) invasion of a judicial sphere
which, according to the insistent stereotype, is non-political.
This public persuasion accounts for the otherwise paradoxical
fact that in 1937, even though the then recent opinions of the
Supreme Court had been vehemently condemned in the press and
in Congressional debate, the reaction against Roosevelt's so-called
"Court Packing" bill was swift and sweeping.' It also explains in
part (although, as it will be pointed out subsequently, only in part)
the condemnation in the United States Senate and in the public
press of the more manifest politico-economic motivations in Nixon's
attempt to place Judges Clement F. Haynsworth and G. Harrold
Carswell on the court.
Congress-or, more particularly, the Senate which must confirm
Presidential nominees to the federal judiciary-has its own view
of its right of action with respect to the court. The filibuster against
President Lyndon B. Johnson's proposal of Justice Abe Fortas for
the position of Chief Justice in the summer of 1968 was undisguisedly partisan-or, nominally, bi-partisan, since the opposition
was composed of Republicans sensing a change of administration
in the fall elections and Southern Democrats hostile to the constitutional doctrines of the court, of which Fortas was then a
member. Yet, the Blitzkrieg of publicity, with which the incoming
Nixon administration quickly proceeded to drive Fortas from the
bench in the spring of 1969, generated a political reaction in Congress-although the first Nixon Congress was not substantially
different in composition from the last Johnson Congress.
Whatever else may have denigrated Judge Haynsworth's nomination, there is rather common understanding that, a definite, if not a
Cf. Swindler, The New Legality, 1932-1968 (New York, 1970), C'hap. 3.
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major, factor was the zeal- for retaliation on the part of Senate
sympathisers with a "'broad constructionalist" regime on the court
which they considered to be in jeopardy. Conservative or politically
centrist Senators joined the so-called "liberals"
in sufficient
numbers to defeat the President-and they did so because it was
politically essential that they not appear to condone the anti-Negro
and anti-labour positions which the active opposition managed to
attribute to the candidate. 9
The same degree of palpable political motivation may be
discerned in the movement in the House of Representatives-the
branch of Congress which has no part in the process of "advice
and consent" to judicial nominations-to institute impeachment
proceedings against Justice William 0. Douglas. While much had
been made of the callous insensitivity of Justice Fortas in the matter
of alleged retainers as private counsel while a member of the bench,
the application of the same moral condemnation to some of Judge
Haynsworth's alleged activities and then the application of the same
to Justice Douglas's retainers has in fact been a swinging of a political
pendulum in diminishing arcs of credibility. (There is, indeed,
another political convention in the United States in obeisance to the
concept of the "non-political" nature of the judiciary, that the
impeachment power of the legislature should not be used to
compromise the independence of 'the judicial branch.)"
The Senate, indeed, has declined to give its "advice and consent" to judicial nominations by the President in approximately one
out of five cases throughout American history." Since the constitutional formula for filling positions on the bench is a precise
application of the " check and balance " principle-fiTst, Presidential
nomination, then Senate confirmation and, finally, commissioning
by the executive branch-this-is a virtual invitation to the application
of political considerations by one or both of the "political" branches
of the Government.
Whether the considerations are political in a partisan or a
philosophical sense does not alter the fact that the Supreme Court
is involved in the political process as a whole. Economic predilections of the court of the 1920s and early 1930s were the real target
of the Senate in its rejection of President Hoover's nomination of
Judge John J. Parker in 1930; they were a substantial ingredient in
9 Cf. 115 Congressional Record, 10390-97 (Sept. 4, 1969).
10 Justice Samuel Chase (1796-1811) was brought to trial under the impeachment
article in 1804, but his impeachment failed by four votes of the necessary
majority. Cf. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History (Boston,
1922), Vol. 1, pp. 279-292.
11 Cf. Swindler, "The Politics of 'Advice and Consent,'" 56 American Bar
Association Journal, 533 (June 1970).
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the fight against, Eortas in 1968, against Haynsworth in 1969 and
against Carswell* in 1970. Parker and Haynsworth were charged
with anti-labour and :anti-Negro bias; Fortas was castigated for his
support of 'opinions (most of .-which predated his coming to the
court) asserting broad rights, for criminal defendants against the
prosecutorial process; and .Carswell was the target of a series -of
charges adding up to mediocrity; as Senator William B. Spong of
Virginia expressed it, "The South had been patronized in -that the
President offered a nominee who was less, than qualified." 12
The Senate, and rather often the House of Representatives as well,
does not hesitate to discuss the -propriety of judicial behaviour, as
well as the popular acceptability of judicial interpretation of constitutional questions.. In 1958, and again a decade later, there have
been vigorous Congressional attempts to override specific decisions
of. the Supreme Court,, either by re-enactment of the judicially
invalidated laws or by constitutional amendment. Under the late
Senator Everett -M. Dirksen, a movement .was launched, and came
within a hair's breadth of success; to petition Congress for a constitutional convention which might well 'have sought to return the
United States to the status it had had under the .old Articles of
Confederation. For the most part, however, the Congress has served
as a buffer between the court and, its critics, whether from the.general
public or from the executive- branch. ' Unpopular decisions have
been subjected to a storm of invective in the. course of legislative
debate, and then the subject has been dropped; or a long list of
suggested constitutional amendments have been forwarded by
constituents of members of Congress, introduced pro forma and
then forgotten.13
The issue of court v. Congress v. President has nevertheless
remained acute throughout the mid-twentieth, century. In the
spring of '1937, the
began recanting its previous narrow
doctrine of legislative power. The first cases in effect administered a
coup de grtce to the Roosevelt judicial reform. bill, which the Senate
by then had virtually 'emasculated. ' But in the following, cases, it
became evident that the. court had. made an almost total about-face
(although it saved its own face by "distinguishing" the issues in the
later cases which in actuality reversed or at least nullified the earlier
cases).", The-court under -Chief Justice -Charles Evans Hughes, in
the closing years of the 1930s, rejected the first premise of the constitutional rule which had prevailed f6r- the previous half-centiury.court

Cf. Time Magazine, April 20, 1970, pp. 8-11.
,
".
13 Cf. Swindler, Court and Constitution in the 20th Century (New York, 1969, 1970),
12

14

Appendix B in -each volume. - Swindler, The New Legality, Chap. 4.

Cf.

.

-

,
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the rule of narrowly circumscribed legislative power-and affirmed
the opposite rule of broad power. Stated another way, the old
laissez-faire court ,had viewed the capacity for action in Congress
or state legislatures as limited to specifically permitted authority
spelt out in -the federal or state constitutions; the post-laissez-faire
court had viewed the, competence of legislatures as plenary, only
limited by certain specific restraints set. out in terms in these
constitutions..
Once the first premise had been reversed, as it was in the constitutional decisions from 1937 to 1941, -it followed that a long
line of specific cases, which depended for their own validity upon
the original premise, were -now to -be overturned. This was the
business of the court during the Chief Justiceship of Harlan F.
Stone, roughly corresponding to the period of the Second World
War. The result was a violent public outcry, echoed in Congress,
against what appeared to be a reign of intellectual anarchy in constitutional thought-even though the court under Stone, applying
the 'logical consequences of the New Deal revolution under Hughes,
was actually to be seen in retrospect as substantially consistent in
its course. 1" President Harry S. Truman, reacting to the alarmist
sentiment 'and attempting, as Nixon today is attempting, to dampen
down the volatility of the court, chose as 'his nominees for the bench
a series of candidates who (except for Justice Tom C. Clark) were
of a level of mediocrity well calculated to frustrate any innovative
capability of the bench for the next several years.'"
The result, by the time of Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson's death
in 1953, was a pent-up zeal for what has come to be called
"activism" in constitutional thought. The poles of jurisprudence
on the post-1937 court, which manifested themselves during Stone's
administration, were not conservative v. liberal in the old laissezfaire sense but rather schools of "judicial restraint" established and
epitomised by Justice Frankfurter, and of aggressive construction
which ultimately treated most of the provisions of the Constitution
as virtually self-executing-this school led by Roosevelt's early
appointees, Justices Hugo L. Black and Douglas, augmented by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower's appointees like Chief Justice Earl
Warren and Justice William J. Brennan, and by the appointees of
Presidents John F. Kennedy and Johnson like Justices Arthur
Goldberg and Fortas and Thurgood Marshall.
To say that the court, since 1937, has been committed con15 Id., Chaps. 6, 7; Mason, Harlan Fisk Stone, A Pillar of the Law (New York.

1956), Chaps. 34-38.
16 Cf. Swindler, The New Legality, Chap. 8
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sistently to broad construction is only to reassert that it has been
committed to a view of American political and economic life which
inevitably has direct political consequences
In the cataclysmic
trilogy of decisions of the Warren court-asserting a constitutional
policy of racial equality in default of any legislative declaration,
defining a rule of electoral equality in the face of legislative. inaction,
and providing a basis for equality of treatment of defendants in
the face of contrary procedural tradition 1 -the very foundations
of American political and social organisation have been shifted, as
fundamentally as they were shifted in 1937, with the rejection of
the old laissez-faire rule of law.
What gives all of this a particular significance in the administration of President Nixon is a combination of circumstances. There
is, first of all, the restiveness of contemporary segments of society,
not only in the United States but generally throughout the world.
This has produced two poles of popular opinion, one urging ever
wider-ranging action encouraged by the recent tenor of -constitutional
decision, the other demanding a curtailing of such action to overcome the instability which is blamed upon the recent tenor of
constitutional decision. As a consequence of this dichotomy or
ambivalence there is, secondly, the fact of the election of a President
(by a very narrow margin) by the advocates of curtailment-with
the result that Mr. Nixon has subsequently sought. to consolidate
his position by accommodating the viewpoint of his tenuous majority
(which has not been a majority at all in the first session of the
present Congress). And finally there is a fact which is overlooked
by the general observer but is probably not without substantial
significance-and that is, that Mr. Nixon is the first President since
William Howard Taft who applies to the question of judicial
selection the standards of an active and experienced member of the
legal profession.
All of these factors, taken together, help to explain the position
of President Nixon in respect of the Supreme Court and the current
state of constitutional doctrine. They certainly go a long way toward
explaining his spectacular failures in respect of the solicited " advice
and consent" of the Senate, and 'the Congressional disregard of his
views on the constitutionality of such enactmen-ts as the bill establishing the 18-year level for the voting franchise, to which later
reference is made. ,
17

Swindler, " The Warren Court: Completion of a Constitutional Revolution," 23
Vanderbilt Law Review, 205 (March 1970).
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PRESIDENT NIXON AND CONGRESS ON COURT AND CONSTITUTION

Concerning American constitutional law and the Supreme Court of
the United States, there is a certain folklore which cannot even be
dignified as convention, but is pretty much mythology. The theory
that judicial interpretation of -the Constitution of the United States
neither affects, nor is affected by, the* climate of political and
economic concern -is one such myth. The theory that members'of
the court are selected"by Presidents without regard to their political
or economic beliefs is contradicted by an opposing, theory that men,
once they are appointed to the bdinch, often change from conservative to liberal viewpoints, or vice versa. (Both of these theories
also are myths.) . There is the theory that a " strict construction
or a " broad construction " of the -words of the Constitution will
bring about whatever state of .affairs the speaker has in mind when
he uses these words. More on this in a moment.
But the most obsessiv6 myth so far as constitutional conservatives
are 'concerned, and the -theory which can' seriously handicap a President like -Nixon in his search for potential jurists, is epitomised in
the catchphrase of "prior judicial experience." For American
conservatives, this amounts virtually to a talisman; for them, it is
an axiom that a man who has been seasoned by some years of
experience on a lower court-an intermediate court of appeals or a
trial court, usually in the federal judicial system but alternatively
the high court of a state-will be a "strict constructionist" or at
least will apply the Frankfurter ideal of "judicial restraint" to his
work and thus will not be innovative. Such an appointee to the
Supreme Court, the conservatives argue, will "confine himself to
the letter of the Constitution" and by so doing will not find it
possible to make "judicial amendments " to the Constitution.
In an attempt to document this argument, Senator James 0.
Eastland of Mississippi several years ago read into the Congressional
Record a tabular summary of the "prior judicial experience" of all
Justices of the-Supreme Court up .to that time. This compilation,
prepared by the- Legislative Reference Service of the Library of
Congress, was impeccable in detail and highly informative-but its
value for the conservative argument was at best minimal. In order
to draw a conclusion from the data, one necessarily had first to
define (at least in his own -mind) criteria for-the "good" jurists
throughout the history of the court, and then criteria for the."conservative" and "'liberal" jurists among these. When these two subjective judgments had been made, the only objective conclusion which
could be drawn was that the correlation between either "strict con-
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structionists " or "broad constructionists-" and' "prior judicial
experience" was hardly 50 per cent. 8
The tabulation revealed that the Chief Justices throughout the
nineteenth century had been. without this talisman, as 'had such a
renowned Associate Justice as Joseph Story. Against the extended
prior judicial experience of a constitutional conservative like Justice
Stephen J. Field could be .laced the prior experience of Justice
Oliver Wendell' Holmes, while one of the longest: records of' such
judicial experience in the twentieth century belonged to the brilliant
liberal, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo. On the. court, as President
Nixon found it in January 1969 when he took office, only one presumed "conservative," Justice Potter Stewart, had had any significant amount of earlier experience as a judge, while two of the
"liberals," Justices Brennan and Marshall, had -comparable records
on lower courts.
In the
course of his election campaign Nixon had spoken out
several
times
on the Supreme Court and the' trend of
constitutional
decision. In a television interview on October 3, the candidate said
bluntly that the court had "gone too far" in imputing 'its own
"social and economic views" to the rule of decision. He then
coined his oft-repeated phrase about appointees who would henceforth "interpret the Constitution strictly and fairly," and leave lawmaking to.Congress: A month 'later, on the eve of the 1968 election,
Nixon criticised the court at length as- being dominated by Justices
who were unfamiliar with crimina'l law and procedure, as explaining
why the court had developed its sweeping, doctrines of rights of
. ' ,Icriminal defendants.19
As he took office in January 1969, Mr. Nixon already had his
most important opportunity for- Supreme Court appointment: Chief
Justice. Warren, having. tendered his resignation the previous summer,
had been. requested by, the incoming President to continue in office
through the 1968 term. of court ending in June 1969., Thus, rather
conspicuously, the new President conducted his, canvass for a new
Chief Justice with criteria already widely publicised. He sought a
man with previous -judicial experience, who would be a "strict
constructionist" or, at. least ideologically, in the "middle of the
-road,",and one who would organise a judicial effort to strengthen the
forces of "law and order."
,
There is a certain amount of folklore, but substantially more
substance, -to the choice of, a Chief Justice of the United States.
.While it is true that a Chief Justice has' only one ,vote, out of ;nine
18

111 Congressional Record, 1905-6 (Feb. 3, 1965).

19 New York Times, Oct. 3, Nov. 2, 1968.
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among a group of independent-minded colleagues, he is in fact the
head of the entire federal judiciary and has been since the days of
Chief Justice Taft.. When he elects to read the opinion of the court
in seminal decisions, he tends to be accepted in the popular mind as
the spokesman for the court as an institution. This image is further
enhanced when he speaks on the "state of the judiciary," as he does
annually before such major professional groups as the. American
Law Institute and the American Bar Association.
There have' only been 15 Chief Justices in American history,
and no President other than George Washington has appointed, more
than one during his tenure-even Franklin Roosevelt, who was
elected 'to four terms.. Thus the' selection of Warren Earl Burger
to succeed Earl Warren gave Mr. Nixon an exceptional opportunity
to focus public attention on the court and the men he sought to
place thereon. That the, President was fully cognisant of this
opportunity was reflected both in the nationally televised announcement of Chief Justice Burger's selection and in Nixon's unprecedented
appearance at the bar of the court in June on the occasion of Mr.
Burger's swearing-in. The President in 'a tribute to the retiring
Chief Justice further utilised the occasion to invite the public to a
calmer retrospect on the chapter in judicial history which was then
ending."
Whether the President got everything he said he was seeking in
his new Chief Justice remains to be seen-few Presidents have, in
fact. Theodore Roosevelt, in a familiar communication to Henry
Cabot Lodge in 1902, probably ,had a more detailed list of requirements -than most Presidents, and in .setting them forth he made it
clear that he considered the judiciary to be an .integral part of the
American political machinery. Roosevelt wrote:
.
In the ordinary and low sense which we attach to the words "partisan"
and "politician," a Justice of the Supreme Court should be neither. But
in the higher, sense, in the proper sense, he is not in my judgment fitted
for the position unless he is a party man, a constructive statesman, constantly keeping in mind his-adherence to the principles and policies under
which this nation has been built up, and in accordance with which it must
go on; and keeping in mind also his relations with his fellow statesmen
who in other branches of government' are striving in co-operation with
2
him to advance the ends of government. 1

Justice Holmes, concerning whom the Roosevelt message had
been so explicit on the eve of his appointment 'to the court, astounded
the Rough Rider President in one of his first opinions as Justice.
Dissenting in one of the "trust-busting" cases, Holmes warned
20
21

Cf. proceedings reported in 90 Sup.Ct..1-7 (1969).
Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore 'Roosevelt and Henry Cabot
Lodge (New York, 1925), Vol. I, p. 518..
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against a zeal for quick reform by judicial decision which amounted
to "a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was
clear seem doubtful, and before which even well-settled principles
of law will bend." To ride roughshod over legal rights of those
who had flouted legal rights of lesser men, said Holmes, would mean
"the universal disintegration of society into -single men, each at war
with all the rest." 22
President Nixon was similarly astonished When, in its opening
opinion in the 1969 term, the Burger court speaking through the
Chief Justice in a per curiam opinion summarily upheld the lower
courts' order for prompt racial desegregation of public schools in
the state of Mississippi. 3 On the other hand, the opinion in the
Mississippi case might have been. handwriting on the wall for the
devotees of "strict construction "--for if "strict construction"
means adhering to the precedents in constitutional law as in other
areas of law, the precedents to be followed in matters of racial
integration are almost entirely those of the Warren court from
1953 to 1969.
In any event, in Chief Justice Burger it has been rather evident
from the outset that the President has found a-leader of the federal
judiciary, and perhaps of the entire American bar, in the tradition of
Chief Justices Taft and Hughes. 'Mr. Burger's earnest and repeated
calls for a simplifying and modernising of the whole of the American
judicial process, both federal and state, have already stimulated
more searching studies of existing state and federal court systems
and procedures than have been conducted in the past 30 years.2 4
While the selection of a new Chief Justice has become in retrospect one of Mr. Nixon's more fortunate decisions, the furious struggle
between the White House and the Senate over the successor to
Justice Fortas squandered much of the President's political capital.
Interestingly enough; all sides conceded at the outset that the
executive was entitled to choose men who would presumably accommodate his somewhat right-of-centre constitutional philosophy as
well as the long-frustrated hopes of many others much further to
the right. In the early fall of 1969 it seemed ent'irely reasonable
to expect that any qualified nominee whose name Nixon submitted
would receive the votes of most of the Republicans and the bloc of
Southern Democrats-more than enough for the simple majority
required for confirmation.
22

Northern Securities Co. V. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1903).

23 Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 90 Sup.Ct. 29 (1969).
24

Cf. Burger, " No Man is an Island," 56 American Bar Association Journal, 325
(April 1970); " Proposal: A National Conference on Correctional Problems,"
33 Federal Probation, 3 (Dec. 1969).
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The prolonged and acrimonious contest which instead took
place-not over merely the first but also a second nominee for the
vacant position-revealed the depth of the political and ideological
passions which had been aroused. Beyond any doubt, the unhappy
memory of the double-headed Fortas affair was the root of the
matter in the case of Judge Haynsworth's nomination. The liberals'
resentment at the filibuster, which in 1968 had denied Fortas the
Chief Justiceship, was only compounded by the disaster which befell
Fortas in the spring of 1969. -Whatever might have been the facts
involved in the charges which poured out in a torrent of invective
and innuendo from the Department of Justice, the truth was that
Fortas was driven from the bench by the sheer decibels of
accusation. In the .shock of the bludgeoning thus administered, the
liberals gradually regained consciousness to the sound of selfrighteous trumpetings of all the court-haters of the generations since
1937.
Under the circumstances, it would have required a nominee of
the stature of a Hughes or a Holmes to mollify the Senate-and
Haynsworth, although a competent judge, was not of those proportions. Nixon 'had made much of his intention to nominate a
Southerner-too much, indeed, for it 'alerted the ethnic lobbies in
contemporary American politics to. the possibility that the nominee
might be chargeable with racial bias. While such charges were in
fact quickly lodged, the opposition led by Senators Joseph Tydings
of Maryland and Birch Bayh of Indiana probed elsewhere for the
Achilles 'heel, and found it in the ethic which 'had been so remorselessly apostrophised in the Fortas affair. If the administration
through the Attorney-General (who, for Nixon as for Eisenhower,
was the official charged with leading the search for judicial
candidates) was going to claim the level of circumspection that it
said it had set in re Fortas, it would have to assume the risk that its
own standard could be used against it.
And so it was, in both the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations.
In both instances, political and ideological considerations could
readily be subsumed under a bi-partisan colloquium affirming the
proposition that candidates for the high bench were to be blameless
in every detail of their careers. While this might prove to be a
standard considerably. beyond what was required of Caesar's wife,
President Nixon sensed the political opportunism which lurked
beneath the surface of the Senate opposition' Having already discarded the fiction that ideology was not a consideration in the choice
of Supreme Court justices, the President blurted out his pique at the
Senate, not once but twice. On the first occasion, in a letter to
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Senator William B. Saxbeof' Ohio, Nixon complained that the
Senate, in opposing Carswell, was denying him his constitutional
right to have jurists of his own choosing on the court-a suggestion
that Senate confirmation was essentially a formality. In the aftermath of Senate reaction to this indiscretion, and with the Carswell
defeat added to his record, the President unburdened himself of a
petulance mixed with bravado, in a press conference in which.he
declared he would await the day when a Senate would be. elected
which would not hesitate to confirm nominees'like Haynsworth
and Carswell.2"
Whether this was he "old Nixon" of 1960, which his legion
of watchful critics are always seeking, or whether the press conference was an attempt at saving face, the result has been a selfconscious reiteration of the protestatioi of judicial ethic by both
President and Senate. In view of the political and ideological
interests lying so close to the surface, one may be permitted to
doubt that this protestation is actually the paramount criterion in
judicial confirmation. At the same time, the protestation has given
both White House and Congress an opportunity to back off from
their confrontation when the final nomination for the Fortas
vacancy was sent to Capitol Hill. In Judge Harry A. Blackmun
all parties discerned an acceptable record of competence and balance,
and his confirmation proceeded Without further incident.
3.

THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE

1970s

Changes in administration, whether of American Presidents or
American Chief Justices, do not always presage changes in national
direction, whatever may be said by or about the principals in the
roles. Of course, the appearance on the scene, at virtually the same
time, of a moderately conservative President and a presumably
non-activist Chief Justice of his own dhoosing, appears to forecast a
significant shift in emphasis-particularly when the Chief Executive
has consistently made such an issue of the necessity for a shift.
Mr. Nixon, being a knowledgable lawyer (despite some of his public
statements uttered, one hopes, without considered analysis),
presumably is aware that no spectacular reversal of constitutional
direction is likely, much less desirable.
American constitutional law in the twentieth century has been
divided into two broad eras. The first, actually beginning in the
1880s and expiring in 1937, was the era of laissez-faire dominance
in constitutional as well as in economic thought. The second,
25
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beginning in 1937 and continuing to the present, has been an era in
which a consistent majority of the court has acquiesced in the
principle of untrammelled legislative authority. The fundamental
division within the court in this era has been between 'the advocates
of judicial restraint, who contend that the court has done all that
should be expected of it when it has assured the legislative branch
of its power to act-and the 'activists who contend that the Constitution lodges a power of action somewhere in cases where the
legislative' or executive branch neglects to exercise the power and
as a consequence established constitutional rights may languish.
The bankruptcy of laissez-faire economics in the Great
Depression of the 1930s left little doubt in the minds of most
objective scholars and all but the most reactionary lawyers and
politicians that the constitutional -jurisprudence based upon the
presumed validity of that economics was also bankrupt. In the
ensuing 30 years, a whole new generation of lawyers and jurists
has come into its own; 'for them, -talk of returning to something
like the state of, affairs before 'the New Deal is irrelevant. Political
memory, especially for some Congressional chauvinists, may extend
back before 1937, but professional legal memory dates substantially
from 1953. In other words, it is the constitutional doctrines of the
Warren court which may come in for judicial reassessment in the
coming years.
But what this reassessment will actually mean, in terms of a
withdrawal from advanced positions taken in the heyday of activism,
is likely to disappoint the extreme conservatives. Of the three great
constitutional propositions enunciated during the Warren Chief
Justiceship, only the third appears to be liable to any substantial
degree of qualification. The first, the assertion of racial equality
before the law, is not only so fundamentally sound as to be beyond
serious debate, but was in effect a belated judicial implementation
of constitutional enactments of a century before.2 6 Moreover,
Congress has incorporated the basic principles set out in the
desegregation cases in a succession of statutes of increasingly broad
scope-which in turn have been broadly interpreted by the court."
Finally, there is the basic political fact of life, that no candidate for
major public office outside of the most backward rural areas of
the nation can expect to win a following in active opposition to
the basic principle of racial equality guaranteed by law.
26
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As to the second of .the great trilogy of the Warren court-the
principle of reapportionment- which in the short course of 20 months
altered the whole frame of reference for representative government
in the United States 2 -a desperate effort to frustrate the effect of
these decisions appears to have lost its momentum. Members of
Congress whose local power bases were in depopulated regions
somewhat analogous to the old "rotten borough" issue in Britain,
naturally reacted to the outraged cries of their few but longentrenched constituents.
Vested interests in state and local
government, who persuaded themselves that the court in its
reapportionment decisions had invaded an area totally outside the
sphere of federal interest, organised a succession of proposals for
constitutional amendment to reverse the decisions. Championed
though these were by the late Senator Dirksen of Illinois, the proposals consistently failed of the necessary majority in the Senate.
Thereafter, came the most desperate effort of all-to prevail upon
the states to petition Congress under a never-used section of the
Constitution 2" to call a national constitutional convention on the
subject of a reapportionment amendment.
Time may well have settled the issue by now. With most of
the state legislatures having accepted -the reapportionment doctrine
and made, in many instances, quite drastic changes in the distribution
of electoral districts, there is unlikely to be any genuine enthusiasm
for a return to an American version of the "rotten borough." Some
legislatures have rescinded their original petitions; but the petitions
which were presented to Congress were so disparate-and also so
suspect, coming from malapportioned legislatures which had subsequently been altered-that it would be difficult to conceive of any
unanimous sense in them. Finally, there is the fact that Congressional inaction on the matter could scarcely be made the subject
of judicial compulsion.
Thus the second of the great constitutional innovations of the
Warren court seems likely to pass into history to a steadily declining
volume of discussion. The American people, it may be said, have
adjusted themselves emotionally as well as politically to the fact
of reapportionment rather more speedily than they have adjusted to
the question of racial integration. The practical likelihood of
reversal of national direction in either of these subjects, however,
is minimal.
28
29

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1965).
Art. V of the Constitution provides in part: " The Congress, . . . on application
of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, shall call a convention for
proposing amendments.

OCT. 1970], , The Supreme Court, the President and Congress

687

• There remain, then, the most emotionally volatile questions 'of
all, in the
of constitutional rights of -individuals who are
defendants in criminal, proceedings.. 'With these decisions 10 the
Warren court's activist majority reached its zenith- and. provoked
the loudest of all the outcries against the court itself. In part, this
is probably to be accounted for by the fact that the decisions were
handed down in a period in current history when social unrest in
urban areas. suddenly mushroomed into 'spectacular dimensions. The
frustrated opposition to. both the desegregation and reapportionment
doctrines found in this phenomenon an opportunity to vent their
protests against the constitutional doctrine broadening the rights of
defendants and suspects.
Much of the urban insurrections of the mid-1960s occurred in
Negro ghettoes; those who were embittered at the desegregation
doctrine but recognised the futility of opposing it found an outlet
for their bitterness in decrying the judicial decisions allegedly
hampering the police forces in dealing with the rioters. Most of the
uprisings took place in the decaying centres of the great cities;
accordingly, those who resented the reapportionment doctrine could
campaign for more stringent criminal liabilities against those whose
numbers had given them, at 'least potential control of the electoral
process.
Upon careful analysis, it can persuasively be argued that the
fundamental constitutional doctrines of the defendants' rights cases
are distinguishable from the problems represented in the wave of
violence, substantially characterised by old-fashioned cases of common law crime, which has become one of. the major critical issues
of American -life-the " law and order" issue on which both
President and Congress are fairly well united. The elemental
principle in the Gideon case that if defendants in any- criminal
cases are entitled to benefit of legal counsel then the fact of indigency
could not deprive some defendants of such counsel-was as fundamentally, morally correct as the doctrine in Brown v. Board of
Education. As an elemental principle,, it could equally be conceded-as it was. held in Miranda-thatthe indigent's right to such
counsel began as early in the accusatorial process as any other
defendant's right to 'counsel.
Finally, as the majority said in
Escobedo that right began at the precise point where the canvass
of possible suspects came into focus upon one specific suspect."
These three cases rather tidily define a basic constitutional theory
-area

30 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1%3); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
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of criminal law. The difficulty with the theory has been twofold:
In the first place, 'the harsh practicalities of applying the 'theory to a
succession of particular issues, has -placed the court's commitment
to equality of fundamental constitutional immunities athwart, the
time-honoured practices of -prosecutors in wider and wider areas of
law enforcement. More importantly, the basic propositions in
Gideon, Escobedo and Miranda have been identified in the popular
mind, with what are actually unrelated factors contributing to the
accelerating violence in urban society. In 'spite of sporadic studies
tending to demonstrate that the fundamental rules on right of counsel
and use of confessions have not in 'practice reduced the effectiveness
of criminal investigation, vociferous critics of the' court 'have insisted
that these principles are inseparable from the whole body of
decisional law explicitly defining the rights of accused and the
limits to investigative and accusatorial procedures.
It is in this area of law, then, that specific revisions and -qualifications of constitutional doctrines 'of the: Warren era 'may be made
*by the Burger court. One may expect that the fundamental principle
in Gideon will be considered as established; indeed,' Congress itself
in the Criminal Justice A&t of 1964 made provision for the systematic
appointment of counsel in indigency cases in the federal courts.'!, At
the same time, the points made in the eloquent dissents of justices like
John Marshall Harlan, Stewart and Byron White in the defendants'
rights cases--reflected in Congress' .own mood in the Safe Streets
and Crime Control Act of 1968 3-may provide the ultimate limits
to the principle. More extreme propositions; like the AttorneyGeneral's proposal for "preventive 'detention," have run into such
vigorous criticism from even the conservatives 'in the Senate that'it
seems likely that the basic guarantees of .the American Bill of
Rights will be adheredfto.
If President Nixon does in'
fact get the kind of a Supreme Court
he says he seeks, its fundamental characteristic-and its fundamental
difference from the Warren court-is likely to be a denial of the
premise that any provisions in the Constitution are self-executihg.
This is simply to say that the school of "judicial restraint" founded
by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson will probably regain
ascendancy-if -it has not already done' so in the persons of the
Chief Justice and 'Justices Harlan, Stewart, White and (from Nixon's
viewpoint) presumably Blackmun. With 'the practical -likelihood
that two or three more'appointments will fall to Nixon's lot, the
probability is that "restraint" will be the keynote of the 1970s.
32
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As "strict constructionists," such a court will presumably stand
by the precedents represented in -the fundamental holdings in the
landmark cases of the Warren years-in racial equality and in voter
equality, and in the most elemental sense in equality of persons before
the criminal law. But this is not to say that the fundamental
holdings in these cases will not be substantially, even drastically,
circumscribed, at least. in respect of criminal law and the right of
society to its own self-pres'rvation.
In the recent enactment of a federal law lowering the voting age
to 18 years, Congress has set the stage for a test of the new court's
fundamental constitutional philosophy. Although Congress rejected
President Nixon's protest that the altering of -the electoral franchise
could only be accomplished by constitutional amendment and not
by statute, the final draft of the statute offered the opportunity for
an expeditious test of the question.14 Aside from the involved
political strategies in the bill 'as it was then .signed by the Presidenttying the voting age provision to an extension of the voting rights
statute of 1965-and aside from the prospect .that the government
will not press over-zealously for the validity of the age provision in
any constitutional test, the majority in the case (if such a case is
entertained) could turn upon the prevailing constitutional theory in
the court as it is then composed.
This is not -to predict the outcome of any such case if it is
adjudicated; the court might adhere to Frankfurter's fundamental
admonition and avoid pronouncement of a general constitutional
principle even while disposing of the simple question of legality.
All that can be said at this premature stage is this: The Constitution
in fact being silent on the specific question, an extremely narrow
and "strict" construction might hold that Congress could not act
until the silence had been broken by authorising action through
formal amendment. Conversely, an opposite but not necessarily
"broad" construction might hold that. the age of a voter, being
already established by statute, could be, changed by simple statutory
change-it need not be considered, in other words, analogous to
either the Fifteenth or Nineteenth Amendments, which defined the
generality of the franchis6 in terms of race aid sex.
Another respect in which the Burger court may shift from the
emphasis of the 'Warren court is in 'the piecemeal incorporation of
guarantees of the American Bill of Rights into the restraints laid
upon .the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.3" For one thing,
this process of incorporation is now substantially.complete; even
34
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the Warren court had had little remaining to be done in this respect,
unless it took 'up Justice Douglas' suggestion that there were
"penumbras" to ,the Bill of Rights which might be indefinitely
In view of Justice Harlan's most eloquent dissents or
extended."
separate concurrences in these cases-the general tenor of which
was an endorsement of Frankfurter's refutation of the "incorporation " concept-the Douglas theory is -unlikely to be pursued in the
immediate future.
There may, indeed, be a calculated avoidance of emphasis upon
the "equal protection", clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
through which the basic principles in the Warren court trilogy and
its piecemeal incorporation of the Bill of Rights were effected. For
the theory of the universality and absolutism of "equal protection"
as ,the activists developed and applied it has as its fundamental
premise the superiority of the relationship between the citizen of
the United States and the Government of the United States-in
contrast to the prior emphasis *upon' the primacy of' the citizen's
relationship to his state government. This duality of citizenship
within the American Union-a concept so often puzzling to
observers from abroad-attained major significance with the great
expansion of Fourteenth Amendment application in the past decade:
Whereas, throughout most of American history, the individual was
expected to look to the government of his own state for protection
of fundamental rights, the activist emphasis upon the universality
of federally-guaranteed fundamental rights has increased the
tendency to rely upon the federal government for this protectionas protection against the states themselves, in fact.
The concern of many persons in Congress, as well as the President,
at the apparent erosion of the federal-state relationship over the
past 30 years will in all likelihood be reflected in the type of domestic
legislation which may be enacted in the 1970s, and hence the type
of legislative questions which may come on for review before the
court. The present sequence of second thoughts (or, more accurately,
third thoughts) on the constitutional amendment on the electoral
college is a demonstration of the ambivalence of the present. If
the absolute and universal validity of the principle of "one man,
one vote" were accepted, as it has been accepted up to now by the
activists on the court, the simple abolition of the electoral college
and -direct popular election of the President would be another of
those pieces of tidy logic which characterised the "universal
equality" doctrine of the Warren court.
36
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But there are various reasons for the prolonged Congressional
inaction on the question. One principal reason is the fact that
American political life has made a pragmatic accommodation of
the technicality of the electoral college: the two-party system of
national government has in effect caused the letter of the, constitutional formality to correlate with the capacity of the major parties
to win majorities of the vote in individual states. In other words,
the majority or even a plurality of the popular vote in any state
captures the entire electoral vote. Against the argument that this
may nullify the effect of a close popular vote and thus might conceivably result in the election of a Presidential candidate with less
than a majority of the vote as between the major parties, there is
now the argument that a worse evil might arise in the form of
innumerable splinter parties which would accomplish this very fact.
Another, rather inchoate reason for hesitation on the electoral
amendment may be traced to the matter of national citizenship
once more. Direct popular election of a President of the United
States by the people of the United States means one more step in
the direction of orienting the citizen permanently toward the
federal government-and one more step in the deterioration of the
significant role of the states in the federal system in America.
The ultimate shape of constitutional doctrine in the Burger court
of the 1970s cannot, of course, be predicted with any reasonable
degree of validity on the basis of isolated opinions in the court's
first -term. The Mississippi school case, which at the time was
treated as a sign of continuing judicial vigour in the enforcement of
integration, actually was a simple declaration that a lower court
order based upon a valid statutory formula was to be obeyed. A
Maryland case, distinguishing between the expression of unpopular
ideas which could be constitutionally protected and blocking of
public ways in order 'to express the ideas, which could not,
essentially continues the line of reasoning which had already been
developed by Justice Black. 7 This was a unanimous opinion;
another Maryland case, in which 'a five-to-three majority rejected a
special lower court finding that a state limit on the amount of relief
for which an indigent family was eligible violated the "equal
protection" 'clause,38 may be a straw in the wind. Another five-tothree division, on a New York case in which the majority held that
juveniles as well as adult defendants are constitutionally entitled to
invoke the standard of reasonable doubt in criminal proceedings,39
37 Bachellar v. Maryland, 90 Sup.Ct. 1312 (1970); cf. Adderley v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39 (1966).
38 Dandridge v. Williams, 90 Sup.Ct. 1153 (1970).
.9 Re Winship, 90 Sup.Ct. 1068 (1970). But cf. Dickey v. Florida, 90 Sup.Ct. 1564
(1970).
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may also be cited as a sign of increasing ambivalence on the general
issue of defendants' rights.
Even so casual an observatiori as this, on a sampling of constitutional comment in the course of the first term of the Burger
court, demonstrates the iccepted fact of the judiciary's impact on
contemporary political and social issues. It confirms the statement
made by Chief Justice Stone: "When the courts deal, as ours do,
with great public questions, the only protection against unwise
decisions, and even judicial usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their
action and fearless comment upon it." 40 That comment may come
more often from the legislative than from the executive branch of
-the government, but the readiness of either of these branches to
express itself on constitutional doctrines of what Professor Alexander
Bickel has called "the least dangerous branch," may be the secret
to the political equilibrium which the American version of separation
of powers has maintained up to now.

40 Quoted in Report of Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers

(91st Congress, 1st Session), Sen.Rep., No. 91-549, p. 7.

